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Abstract. What is a conservative disposition? And can it supply any insights 
into the UK’s changing constitution? We offer answers to these questions by 
identifying core elements of a conservative disposition and exploring how it offers 
contingent guidance to public lawyers striving to make sense of a changing 
constitution. Our goal is to show why a conservative disposition remains relevant to 
public lawyers, not despite but in large measure because the constitution is 
changing. We examine the disposition’s relationship with change and review how a 
conservative disposition offers open-ended guidance on when to pursue change, how 
to pursue it, how much of it to pursue at any point in time, and what reasons should 
motivate it. After evaluating arguments against the relevance of a conservative 
disposition to constitutional thought, we relate conservative arguments to two 
important proposals for constitutional reform: the withdrawal of the UK from the 
European Convention on Human Rights and a written constitution. 
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What is a conservative disposition? And can it supply any insights into a UK 
constitution distinguished in recent years by rapid and far-reaching change? We 
offer initial answers to these questions. Our starting point is that conservatism 
presents a curious contrast within the study of public law in the UK. On the one 
hand, it is commonplace for arguments, policies, cases, individuals, and even large 
spans of constitutional history to be characterised as ‘conservative’. On the other 
hand, these are often no more than throwaway characterisations, with little 
reflection on what it means to describe something or someone in this way.1 Not only 
are answers to questions about the nature, commitments, and limits of conservatism 
not forthcoming, but the questions themselves are seldom even posed. We suspect 
that, as a result, conservatism—and especially a conservative disposition—is poorly 
understood within constitutional thought. In this essay, we identify core elements of 
a conservative disposition before explaining why it offers arguments relevant to 
public lawyers striving to make sense of the UK’s changing constitution.  
 
Public lawyers are not alone in their general neglect of conservative thought. A 
similar pattern has been noted in political philosophy, where conservatism regularly 
fails to earn a place alongside philosophies and ideologies that receive sustained 
study, such as liberalism, socialism, libertarianism, and Marxism.2 To the extent that 
conservatism is examined in depth, it is often by those self-identifying as 
‘conservative’.3 In recent years, there have been other accounts—critical4 as well as 
celebratory5—but often these are aimed primarily at popular audiences. That it has 
been predominantly conservatives writing about conservatism might reinforce the 
absence of much interest among those who do not identify as ‘conservative’. More 
                                                 
1
 An exception is Martin Loughlin, who points to conservatism’s role in shaping the intellectual history of 
UK public law: Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (OUP 1992). 
2
 See Martin Beckstein and Francis Cheneval, ‘Conservatism: Analytically Reconsidered’ (2016) 99 
Monist 333, 333. See also FA Hayek, ‘Why I am Not a Conservative’ in The Constitution of Liberty 
(Routledge 2006) 355, in which he doubts ‘whether there can be such a thing as a conservative political 
philosophy’. 
3
 See eg Michael Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ [1962] in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays 
(rev edn, Liberty Fund 1991); Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Faber and Faber 1954). 
4
 See eg Ted Honderich, Conservatism (Penguin 1991); Ted Honderich, Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, 
Bush, Blair? (Pluto Press 2005); Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund 
Burke to Sarah Palin (OUP 2011). 
5
 See eg Roger Scruton, How to be a Conservative (Bloomsbury 2014); Roger Scruton, Conservatism: 
Ideas in Profile (Profile Books 2017); Kieron O’Hara, Conservatism (Reaktion 2011). 
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pointedly, for many, conservatism appears reducible to opposition to ‘the progressive 
view of humankind and society’.6 As will become clear, it is possible to conceive of 
conservatism in ways divorced from what some regard as its unwelcome 
associations. 
 
Two further reasons for the general lack of academic engagement bear mention.7 
First, it might be suggested that conservative thought is not the most fertile ground 
for the analytic reflection that characterises academic inquiry. Conservatism is often 
said to eschew theorising about human affairs, at least insofar as systematic 
statements and abstract principles are viewed as unreliable guides when trying to 
make sense of the complex and concrete traditions of behaviour that shape political 
communities.8 It might be tempting to assume that little scope therefore exists for 
systematic reflection or analytical probing about a way of thinking that itself 
prioritises practical knowledge over theoretical reflection.9 Our view is that, to the 
contrary, conservative thought has much to offer reflective inquiries into human 
affairs.10 Second, there may be some who assume that the study of conservatism is of 
interest only to those whose views lean to the political right. The popular ascription 
of the small-c label ‘conservative’ to many right-of-centre parties, together with the 
fact that some such parties are called capital-C ‘Conservatives’, encourages this 
assumption.11 But names of parties bear no more than a casual relationship to 
                                                 
6
 Noël O’Sullivan, ‘Conservatism’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds), The Cambridge History of 
Twentieth Century Political Thought (CUP 2003) 151. For a biting critique of conservatism, and its 
relation to social and political inequality in particular, see Robert Eccleshall, ‘English Conservatism as 
Ideology’ (1977) 25 Pol Stud 62. 
7
 See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (OUP 1996) 317-21.  
8
 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in Politics’ in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (rev edn, 
Liberty Fund 1991).  
9
 Aiding such an (erroneous) assumption is that the fact that conservatism is (wrongly) associated with few 
‘great texts’: EHH Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (OUP 2002) 14. This supposed absence of a large 
and distinct body of work that can be studied by successive generations might create the impression that 
conservatism lacks intellectual heft. See eg W H Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: Volume 2—
The Ideological Heritage (rev edn, Routledge 2003) 189-90.  This is unfortunate: conservatism has 
produced more ‘great texts’ than commonly assumed, including by Burke, Hegel, Hume, Oakeshott, and 
perhaps Descartes.  
10
 For the suggestion that more scope exists for systematic reflection on conservatism than generally 
acknowledged, see Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (n3) 407; John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism 
(Cornell UP 1998) 2-3; Beckstein and Cheneval (n2).  
11
 Yet, many parties on the right pursue radical policies at odds with conservative evaluations, whilst some 
parties on the left demonstrate a conservative posture on some policy issues. For discussion whether the 
UK Conservative Party had abandoned conservatism by the close of the twentieth century, see Green 
(n9); John Ramsden, ‘Political Parties: Conservative Politics and Constitutional Ideology’ in Robert 
Blackburn (ed), Constitutional Studies: Contemporary Issues and Controversies (Mansell 1992) 79. For a 




philosophies of the same or similar name, and the study of political thought is 
misdirected if folded into an examination of a namesake party. For our part, we do 
not equate the conservative disposition with any one party or point on the political 
spectrum.12  
 
There are more specific reasons that may account for the relative inattention of UK 
public lawyers. Above all, it is possible that public lawyers tend to assume that 
whatever insights conservatism offers apply only to the ‘old’ customary constitution 
that resembled, in Edmund Burke’s terms, an ‘entailed inheritance’13 of institutions, 
practices, and laws, which in turn reflected and reinforced stability, longevity, 
tradition, continuity, evolutionary change, and the ‘brutal pragmatism’14 of whatever 
works. It is perhaps less obvious that conservative thought has much to say about 
the emerging ‘new’ constitution and its association with rapid change, the 
prioritising of principle over practice, the weakening of custom, the fracturing of the 
unitary state, and the complex interplay of domestic law and international legal 
regimes.15 Not only does the UK’s constitution no longer have such strong 
connections with history, pragmatism, and ‘the way things were’, but many public 
lawyers no longer revere traditional ways of doing things.16 For much of the last 
century, most public lawyers shared a basic respect for the constitution’s historic 
institutions and practices. Today a reforming spirit has taken hold.17  
 
We argue that conservative thought has something significant to offer public 
lawyers even within the so-called ‘new’ constitution, and as a partial antidote to this 
reforming spirit. Our goal is to show why what we term ‘a conservative disposition’ 
                                                                                                                                            
policy for much of the last century, which seemed to be shaped to varying degrees by conservative 
insights. See Peter Dorey, The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional 
Conservatism (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
12
 See also GA Cohen, ‘Rescuing Conservatism: A Defence of Existing Value’ in R Jay Wallace, Rahul 
Kumar and Samuel Freeman (eds), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon 
(OUP 2011) 203; Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2001) 5; 
Torbjörn Tännsjö, Conservatism For Our Time (Routledge 1990) ix.  
13
 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (first published 1790, Penguin 2004) 119.  
14
 Nevil Johnson, Reshaping the British Constitution: Essays in Political Interpretation (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004) 10.  
15
 Loughlin’s influential intellectual history of public law—which maps a rivalry between ‘conservative 
normativist’ and ‘liberal normativist’ approaches, punctuated by the rise and fall of the ‘functionalist 
style’—perhaps reinforces the tendency of some public lawyers to associate conservative thought with the 
‘old’ constitution. See Loughlin (n1). 
16
 See Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline? (Heinemann 1992) 32; 
Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2013) 105-118. 
17
 See Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘Rationalism in Public Law’ (2013) 76 MLR 708. 
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remains relevant to public lawyers no matter their ideological inclinations, and not 
despite but in large measure because the UK’s constitution is changing. We begin by 
explaining why we conceive of conservatism as a ‘disposition’ (section 2). Our sense 
is that this disposition is not well understood, and is all too often reduced to 
misleading simplifications concerning its relationship with change, which tends to be 
unhelpfully depicted as negative and oppositional. We explore how this disposition 
offers open-ended guidance in response to ‘the problem of change’: that is, when to 
pursue change, how to pursue it, how much of it to pursue at any point in time, and 
what reasons should motivate it (section 3). This disposition responds to the 
problem of change by contributing conservative arguments that are often 
overlooked in debates about political and legal reform. We then review criticisms of 
this disposition (section 4), before explaining its special place in UK constitutional 
thought (sections 5). Once dominant, the conservative disposition no longer enjoys 
its traditional hold on the constitutional imagination. We regret its eclipse within 
constitutional thought, the result of which is to underplay the importance of 
conservative arguments in assessing the case for change. We conclude by relating 
conservative arguments to recent proposals for reform, arguing that public lawyers 
should take conservative arguments seriously when confronting the problem of 
constitutional change (section 6). 
 
2. Conservatism as a Disposition 
 
There are a number of ways to conceive of conservatism. Among them, it can be 
understood as a philosophy, an ideology, and a doctrine.18 Each frame draws out a 
way in which conservatism is an important current within political thought. 
Thinking of conservatism as a philosophy underscores its idea-orientation, isolating 
ideas about human nature, society, politics, law, and government. Thinking of it as 
an ideology draws out its collective dimension as a recurring pattern of political 
thought that has appealed to sizable groupings through time. Conceiving of 
conservatism as a doctrine isolates the familiar sense in which it can be expressed as 
                                                 
18
 Some have denied that conservatism is an ideology, in large measure due to conservatism’s relationship 
to end-defined political positions or ideals of a good society, reviewed later in this section. Others, like 
Huntington, accept the ideological label by opposing conservatism’s ‘situational’ ideology to ‘ideational’ 
ideologies: Samuel P Huntington, ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’ (1957) 51 Am Pol Sci Rev 454. For 
discussion, see Martin Beckstein, ‘What does it take to be a true conservative?’ (2015) 5 Global 
Discourse 4, 5-8. 
 
 6 
policy propositions aimed at coordinating political action and informing government 
programmes. In these overlapping conceptions, conservatism is typically informed 
by accounts of duty, authority, and obedience; the importance of family, community, 
and religion; the fallibility of human nature; the standing of tradition in human 
affairs; the degree of malleability of a political community to reform; the relative 
merits of theoretical and practical knowledge in the conduct of political affairs; the 
place of political or social ends in political action; and the significance of natural and 
social inequalities between persons, among others. 
 
Conservatism can also be conceived of as a disposition, and it is this conception to 
which we appeal. Speaking of conservatism in dispositional terms is common within 
conservative thought,19 but only rarely is it subject to sustained analysis.20 In this 
and the following sections, we articulate core elements of a conservative disposition 
and respond to critiques of it. In its dispositional conception, conservatism resembles 
a ‘posture’,21 ‘standpoint’,22 ‘temper’,23 ‘bias’,24 ‘propensity’,25 ‘outlook’,26 or 
‘attitude’.27 As we explain, however, this is not an unthinking or (merely) 
behavioural, cognitive, or character trait; it rests upon a set of contestable 
intellectual commitments about the value of standing arrangements, human 
reasoning, and the complexity of human organisation. The arguments supplied by 
these commitments show how each one of us can reason conservatively, no matter 
our other philosophical or political commitments.28 More particularly, this 
                                                 
19
 See eg Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (n3) 407; Robert Shuettinger, The Conservative Tradition 
in European Thought (Putnam 1970) 12 (‘Conservatism is not an ideology or a firm set of doctrines on 
man and the universe. We will be nearer the truth if we view conservatism as a disposition’). 
20
 Two notable exceptions are Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (2004) 34 BJ 
Pol S 675 and Kieron O’Hara ‘Conservatism, Epistemology, and Value’ (2016) 99 Monist 423, 430. 
21
 Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (n20). 
22
 Andy Hamilton, ‘Conservatism’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1 
August 2015) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conservatism/> accessed 26 February 2019. 
23
 Anthony O’Hear, ‘Conservatism’ in Edward Craig (ed), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (1st 
edn, Routledge 1998) vol 2, 608; Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (n3) 411. 
24
 Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (n20). For reservations with the behavioural and other 
connotations of the word ‘bias’, see Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, ‘Practical Conservatism’ (2016) 
99 Monist 336, 338 and Kieron O’Hara ‘Conservatism, Epistemology, and Value’ (2016) 99 Monist 423, 
430. 
25
 Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (n3) 408.  
26
 Ernest Young, ‘Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (1994) 74 NCLRev 619, 624. 
27
 Cohen (n12) 207; Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ (n3) 409.  
28
 We are here making a general claim, as we recognise that some normative frameworks speak in great 
detail about processes for deciding about change (e.g. democratic frameworks), but not about the calculus 




disposition entails a certain approach to change, and it is by thinking in dispositional 
terms that it is possible to grasp the reasons for conservatism’s basic confidence in 
the gradual improvement of tried and tested arrangements. A conservative 
disposition does not exhaust all of the multiple strands to conservatism,29 but it 
expresses three overlapping themes recurrent throughout conservative thought: 
traditionalism, scepticism, and organicism.30  
 
We introduce these themes here and elaborate on them in the next section. The first 
is an attachment to established arrangements, together with a resistance to 
precipitate and wholesale change (traditionalism). This attachment to the tried and 
tested is informed by a disposition to maintain things as they are because of an 
appreciation of their value—a value that commands a certain loyalty. The associated 
resistance to change is grounded in the regret that accompanies the loss of existing 
valuable arrangements.31 This relationship to change is reinforced with a sense that 
a community’s identity is intertwined with some of what now exists, such that 
certain changes are inconsistent with the continuity that gives us, individually and 
collectively, a sense of self.  
 
A second main theme is that political wisdom is found in the accumulated experience 
of the community, with abstract reasoning an unreliable guide to political action 
because of its inability to take full account of the complexities of social practices 
(scepticism). Resistance to change can be grounded in scepticism regarding the 
promise of reforms, whereby many reformers are quick to exaggerate intended 
benefits and slow to identify risks of unintended consequences. This theme 
                                                                                                                                            
conservative calculus that is (or at least ought to be) engaged when proposals for change are considered. 
This calculus becomes especially relevant when arguments about whether to pursue a substantive change 
(eg ‘replace A with B’) are at the fore. Those arguments are typically conducted by reference to 
normative frameworks. These normative frameworks dominate much academic thought, with insufficient 
attention paid, we argue, to the conservative calculus that we review. Thinking about the conservative 
disposition does not deny the importance of these normative frameworks, but aims to explain how 
conservative reasoning complicates the assessment of the cases for change brought into sharp relief by 
those normative frameworks. 
29
 On various interpretations of conservatism, see Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (2nd edn, 
Blackwell 1995) 62-93; Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular 
Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott (Faber and Faber 1978). 
30
 There is an imperfect overlap between these three themes and Brennan and Hamlin’s analytical 
distinctions between what they term adjectival, nominal (substantive), and practical conservatism. See 
Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (n20); Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, ‘Conservative 
Value’ (2016) 99 Monist 352; Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Practical Conservatism’ (n24). For criticism, see 
Beckstein, ‘What does it take to be a true conservative?’ (n18). 
31
 Scruton, How to be a conservative (n5) xiii. 
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emphasises that the knowledge required for successful political action is found not in 
abstract speculations of this or that theorist, but in the concrete traditions that 
reflect the accrued wisdom of the community as a whole.32 Scepticism thus reinforces 
the centrality of traditionalism within conservatism: it takes political wisdom to be 
‘embodied, above all, in the deposit of traditional customs and institutions that have 
survived’.33 In its exaggerated formulations, this theme criticises the utopian 
promise of the power of theoretical reason. In its more careful formulations, it 
cautions against the imperfections of human reasoning, given the deep complexity of 
human affairs and the imperfect ability of humans to grasp all of the nuances that 
inform human interaction. In the political domain especially, this disposition 
privileges the wisdom found in the fruits of experience and what Burke called the 
‘latent wisdom of prejudice’, being the ‘untaught feelings’ and ‘mass of 
predispositions’ supplied by the community over time.34 These modes of knowledge 
cannot be fully rationalised, which is not to deny their reasonableness: they are 
sources of knowledge in the management of human affairs that cannot be fully 
summarised or taught.35 
 
A third theme views society as an organic whole that develops within the context of 
inherited institutions (organicism). This emphasises that a political community is a 
complex whole comprised of individuals whose relationships with each other are 
facilitated by shared histories and cultures that find expression in inherited 
institutions themselves not wholly the product of planning. The conservative theme 
of organicism does not reduce the individual to a dispensable unit of a bigger whole; 
rather, it denies that a community is an experiment for a social engineer. Individuals 
are grounded in, and their identities formed within, specific institutions,36 with those 
institutions valued not only for any primary purposes they were designed to fulfil, 
but also for contributing to social identity and shared affiliations. Stressing the 
intricate nature of institutions cautions against precipitate changes to their 
interconnected parts. In this way, this third theme complements the first two: 
viewing a historically evolved community as a complex whole, where individuals 
                                                 
32
 Quinton (n29) 16-17. 
33
 Quinton (n29) 16-17.  
34
 Burke (n13) 183. See generally JGA Pocock, ‘II. Burke and the Ancient Constitution—A Problem in 
the History of Ideas’ (1960) 3 Historical J 125. 
35
 See Gee and Webber (n17) 713-15. 
36
 Quinton (n29) 16. 
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relate to each other within inherited institutions, reinforces a basic appreciation of 
the value of the prevailing institutions (traditionalism) and the political wisdom 
embodied within them (scepticism). It might be suggested that this theme is not 
analytically distinct from traditionalism and scepticism, but is instead a practical 
application of their central insights to the conceptualization of the political 
community. There is something in this: the core themes are related and overlapping, 
with blurred edges between them and, indeed, it is chiefly for this reason that we 
speak of conservative ‘themes’ rather than claims or tenets, which might imply more 
rigid analytical boundaries. That said, it is useful to spotlight organicism as a core 
theme, insofar as it underscores the special weight conservatism ascribes to 
institutions in furnishing order, structure and continuity.37  
 
Our suggestion, then, is that a conservative disposition is best understood in terms 
of these three themes and their evaluations of the status quo and the case for 
change.38 This disposition is generally applicable across a spectrum of human affairs. 
It has relevance for individuals, and expresses assessments of change exhibited by 
any one person to varying degrees, at different times and in different situations. It 
will not be a person’s only disposition and will sit alongside and compete with 
others, which will identify the case for change that the conservative disposition helps 
evaluate. A person may embrace a conservative disposition and, without 
contradiction, be intolerant of injustice and optimistic about the future.39 Our focus 
in this essay is on a conservative disposition’s relationship to political affairs and its 
special relevance for political action (traditionalism), political knowledge (scepticism) 
and political community (organicism). As we explore below, this disposition is 
especially relevant for thinking about one aspect of political life: whether, when, 
how, why, and to what extent to pursue constitutional change. At some basic level, 
after all, most constitutions—whether a traditional customary constitution such that 
as found in the UK or a modern codified constitution such as found in most 
jurisdictions—attempt to temper change. 
                                                 
37
 See Philip Norton, ‘The Constitution’ in Kevin Hickson (ed), The Political Thought of the 
Conservative Party Since 1945 (Palgrave 2005) 93, 93. 
38
 For some scholars of conservative thought, either the status quo or the case for change should be 
awarded priority over the other in conceptualizing conservatism, such that the resistance to change is an 
implication of the attachment to the status quo, or vice versa. Like Oakeshott, we do not commit to a 
relationship of priority: Oakeshott ‘On being conservative’ (n3) 411. 
39
 Cohen argues that his account of the conservative disposition carries no implications for justice:  Cohen 




For now, what bears emphasis is that this disposition informs, often implicitly rather 
than explicitly, the thinking of many who would not identify as conservative. It has 
been embraced across the political spectrum, with Gerald Cohen maintaining that 
‘everyone who is sane has something of this disposition’.40 The compatibility of a 
conservative disposition with a variety of political commitments is due in part to its 
relationship with ‘end-defined political positions’.41 Unlike many intellectual 
commitments, a conservative disposition ‘lacks what might be termed a substantive 
ideal’.42 In its dispositional conception, conservatism is shaped more by evaluations 
of prevailing arrangements and the case for change, which informs arguments 
towards whether, how, when, how much, and why to reform the status quo. It is 
chiefly concerned not with instantiating a set of ideals but with discerning the 
wisdom embodied within existing arrangements. It is, in this sense, ‘situational’.43 A 
conservative disposition recognises that identifying a substantive end is only ever 
‘part of the total picture’.44 It is also important to secure that end in a way informed 
by a reasoned account of the potential for and limits on change in a historically 
evolved community. It is in informing this account and so in assessing the case for 
change that, as explored below, a conservative disposition offers important though 
open-ended guidance for public lawyers. 
 
A conservative disposition may feel unsatisfying to some, including many who may 
at times unknowingly embrace it in their own thought. This dissatisfaction may be 
because several conservative insights seem like homilies that remind ‘readers what 
they already know, but perhaps tend to forget’.45 It may also be because this 
disposition is emblematic of the ‘protean and, to the intellectual mind, untidy 
character of conservatism’.46 As will become clear, it represents a way of thinking 
                                                 
40
 Cohen (n12) 204 (emphasis in original). We agree with Cohen that everyone embraces a conservative 
disposition in at least some aspects of their personal or political thought, but we recognise the underlying 
commitments relating to political action, political knowledge, and political organisation will hold greater 
instinctive appeal to some rather than others.  
41
 Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (n20) 677. 
42
 Huntington (n18) 457. See also Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (n12) 1; Beckstein ‘What does 
it take to be a true conservative?’ (n18). 
43
 Andrew Gamble, ‘Oakeshott’s Ideological Politics: Conservative or Liberal?’ in Efraim Podoksik (ed), 
The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott (CUP 2012) 153, 163. 
44
 Brennan and Hamlin, ‘Analytic Conservatism’ (n20) 678-79. 
45
 Kekes (n10) 4. 
46
 O’Hear (n23). 
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about change that appeals to qualities of mind unfamiliar to the end-defined 
positions that characterise much political thought. Those more familiar positions 
infer that because ‘A would be better than B, therefore we should replace B by A’.47 
A conservative disposition denies the inference, but need not deny ‘A is better than 
B’. It rather supplies a new way of reasoning about change by substituting the 
inference with some complexity in assessing whether, when, how, why, and how 
much to replace B with A. In this respect, the opposite of a conservative disposition 
is not liberalism or socialism or any other philosophy, ideology or doctrine with a 
clear reforming agenda.48 A conservative disposition opposes itself less to any given 
‘ought demand’ (though it may query assumptions animating such demands), but 
more to the evaluation of whether to pursue the demand and the manner in which it 
is pursued. In short, a conservative disposition involves a way of assessing the case 
for change; it is not, as a misleading simplification would have it, invariably opposed 
to change. We aim to correct this simplification by considering how this disposition 
responds to ‘the problem of change’. 
 
3. The Problem of Change 
 
A conservative disposition is concerned with the problem of change: that is, how to 
assess the case for change, how much 
 to pursue at any given time, and on the strength of what reasons. To clarify, our 
appeal to ‘problem’ is not to an unwelcome or harmful situation, but to an inquiry for 
consideration. We seek to highlight how this disposition contributes to the inquiry 
by supplying evaluations beyond those regularly offered in support of change. It is 
often wrongly assumed that a conservative disposition towards change is negative 
and oppositional.49 Properly understood, this disposition involves ‘a positive 
engagement’50 with change, furnishing arguments that recognise that change is 
inevitable and often desirable. As Burke noted, ‘[a] state without the means of some 
change is without the means of its own conservation’.51 The problem of change, then, 
is concerned with assessing the scope, extent, motivation, and need for change. A 
                                                 
47
 Cohen (n12) 220. 
48
 Huntington (n18) 458. 
49
 This view has sometimes been encouraged by conservative thinkers; see eg Huntington (n18) 461. 
50
 Stefan Andreasson, ‘Conservatism’ in Vincent Geoghegan and Rick Wilford (eds), Political Ideologies: 
An Introduction (4th edn, Taylor & Francis 2014) 47, 49. 
51
 Burke (n13) 106. 
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conservative disposition is seized by the complexity of such questions and offers 
open-ended guidance on how to answer them. By elaborating on traditionalism, 
scepticism, and organicism, we explain how this disposition reflects on the different 
qualities of change, among them: between improvements and innovations, between 
evolutions and replacements, between what is intimated by circumstance and what is 
imposed by principle, between redress and perfection, and between the gradual and 
ongoing changes immanent in prevailing arrangements and the planned and 




A conservative disposition is oriented to the fact that what now exists has value.52 It 
signals a refusal to treat established arrangements merely as instantiating a value 
that could be instantiated in some other way or in other arrangements. ‘The 
conservative impulse’, on Cohen’s view, ‘is to conserve what is valuable, that is, the 
particular things that are valuable’.53 This impulse is inconsistent with keeping 
arrangements only for so long as ‘nothing even slightly more valuable comes 
along’.54 A conservative disposition will value and seek to preserve ‘the particular 
bearers of value’ and has reason to resist dispensing with them and to regret their 
‘destruction as such,’ a reason that one would not have if the particular bearers of 
value were valued only for the value that they bear or instantiate.55 By way of 
illustration, it would be to devalue a friend to maintain a friendship only for so long 
as no better friend comes along.56 To lose a friend is a cause for regret even if new 
and greater friendships are subsequently formed.  
 
There is another way of approaching the thought that what now exists has value: the 
special relationship between someone and something. Our arrangements, 
institutions, and ways of doing things have value in the sense just reviewed: they 
have the value that any valuable arrangements, institutions, and ways of doing 
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things do. And yet, for us, they may have special value by virtue of being ours.57 The 
English language has value in facilitating communication and, in this respect, so do 
all languages. However, English language speakers will value the English language 
‘in a more personal way’.58 Even if, on the merits of facilitating communication, 
German is better than English, English language speakers with a conservative 
disposition would not seek to change their language, and not only because of the 
travails of doing so. The English language is theirs and they value it in part because 
it is the language that they speak. Its imperfections do not count against it in this 
way of valuing it; its comparative inferiority as a medium of communication does not 
decrease its value to them. This value relates to it being known and experienced by 
them and is not reducible to other evaluations. 
 
In these two ways, a conservative disposition highlights the loss that accompanies 
change: the loss of something of value, and the loss for someone of something of value.59 
This helps formulate a conservative argument for the problem of change: the loss 
that accompanies change. This argument highlights the special problem of change 
that is commonly missed by those who too quickly infer that ‘A ought to replace B’ 
because ‘A is better than B’. By identifying value in things as they are and as 
reflected in the attachment of persons, this argument complicates the case for 
change.  
 
Contrary to what may be assumed, this does not deny that change is regularly 
justified. The loss of value may be great or small. Prevailing arrangements may 
break down. There may be widespread and sustained dissatisfaction with the status 
quo. Maintaining arrangements in their current state may be burdensome or 
unsustainable.60 In short, a conservative disposition is always aware that change may 
be justified. But the questions whether, how, when, why, and how much to change 
are open, and this disposition brings to bear a distinctive evaluation of the likely 
gains and sure loses from pursuing reforming projects.61 For one with a conservative 
disposition, ‘some things have to just be, they have to just be there, if anything is to 
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be good’.62 In turn, if the existing arrangements have value for us, then we have 
reason to change slowly and to adjust gradually and patiently, rather than in a 
wholesale manner. We can accommodate changes to our language without losing 
our attachment to it, and without denying that it remains our language. But we 
cannot replace our language and maintain the thought that the new language is ours 
too. We may, in time, appropriate what is new and value it as ours, but at the 
moment of wholesale change we will have lost the value of something familiar and 
replaced it with something that is not. In this way, a conservative disposition affords 
continuity and stability, and it disciplines our approach to change by resisting the 
thought that everything is always ‘under review’,63 even as it acknowledges that 




A conservative disposition favours wisdom drawn from accumulated experience. It is 
possible to derive from this three conservative arguments relating to the problem of 
change. First, scepticism counsels modesty, caution, and sobriety when considering 
reform. It is suspicious of the grand reformer, the ‘presumptuous man’, the ‘true 
believer’, and ‘those who have never experienced a wisdom greater than their own’.64 
There is hubris in the thought that, in proposing reforms to that which has lasted for 
generations, one person’s ‘private stock of reason’ is greater than the ‘general bank 
and capital of nations and of ages’.65 The ‘pride of the human intellect’, Burke wrote, 
‘with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of the ages’.66 In 
respect of those complex arrangements that are not open to any one person, or even 
a single generation, to create (a peaceful community, constitutional government, the 
rule of law), there is all the more reason to exercise ‘infinite caution’ before 
‘ventur[ing] upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable 
degree, for ages the common purposes of society’.67 
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Second, a conservative disposition is sensitive to the standing risk of many wrong 
turns in human reasoning. Wrong turns have many causes, including the failure to 
grasp every nuance of existing states of affairs, the imperfect ability to grasp the 
significance of circumstances, and the imperfect ability to account for the wisdom of 
experience. Considerations such as these are often discounted because the truth 
found in concrete experience is difficult to translate into general propositions. Many 
aspects of human experience—tacit knowledge, implied understandings, nuances of 
social practices—do not lend themselves to ready formulation. Taken together, these 
imperfections signal the standing risk that ‘man’s hopes are high, but his vision 
short’.68 When it comes to change, not every promised benefit is realised and not 
every unintended side-effect is anticipated. Almost without exception, the total 
change is ‘more extensive than the change designed’.69 All of this points to the risk 
that change will be mismanaged. The mismanagement of change may be great or 
small, depending on what is being changed. However, a conservative disposition 
cautions that ‘the work of destruction is quick, easy and exhilarating; the work of 
creation slow, laborious and dull’.70  
 
Third, under a conservative disposition, the case for reform is assessed against the 
more gradual, subtle, and constant changes that accompany all human practices. The 
presumption is that existing arrangements should not be lightly displaced, but this 
rests on the judgment that existing arrangements are ‘constantly being subjected to 
the test of experience’.71 The presumption is that there is something to be said in 
favour of arrangements that work passably well. Where change is judged 
appropriate, a conservative disposition is ‘corrective rather than innovative’ insofar 
as it is directed primarily at repairing prevailing arrangements rather than 
introducing wholly new arrangements.72 There will, for sure, be tricky questions 
about whether a proposed change is corrective or innovative, as well as about the 
changes required in order to maintain things as they are.73 But these are questions 
that, under this disposition, cannot be answered in the abstract but only after a 
careful analysis of the actual working of current arrangements. For these reasons, 
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this posture towards change is sometimes termed ‘organic’ rather than ‘artificial’.74 
Decisions about whether change is required, and if so the type and extent of change, 
should generally be justified on the grounds of experience.75 Change should be 
directed not at vindicating abstract principles, but at addressing challenges arising 
through experience. This recalibrates how imperfect arrangements are assessed: 
recognising that current arrangements should be assessed in the round and in terms 
of the historical record increases the willingness to conserve arrangements found 




In Burke’s account, society is a ‘partnership not only between those who are living, 
but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be 
born’.76 Burke denied that society is ‘nothing better than a partnership agreement in 
a trade of pepper and coffee […] or some other such low concern, to be taken up for 
a little temporary interest’.77 Rather, it is a partnership of far greater ambition: a 
partnership in all science, all art, every virtue, and all perfection.78 This account of 
the community points to a conservative vision of a good society, albeit not one of the 
same order as the visions of end-defined political philosophies: it denies that the 
community has a specific end, enterprise or goal that one can plan to achieve in one 
lifetime or many.79 Governing a community is not like achieving a definite plan with 
efficient means and stipulated ends; governing is a responsibility for its members and 
their intermediate associations and their pursuit of ends. Institutions have a very 
special role in furnishing the stability and continuity that enables the community’s 
members to pursue their own ends.  
 
This in turn highlights the significance of certain conservative arguments respecting 
existing institutions and their reform: on the value of what exists, on the value for us 
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of what is here and now, and on the complexities of grasping the whole of the 
problem of change. When reforms have as their purpose or effect the activities of 
others, it is important to be cautious not to think ‘of making men, and binding 
nature to our designs’; rather, one should heed Burke’s reminder that ‘[p]lans must 
be made for men’.80 Those men and women are already situated within existing 
institutions. Before proposing reforms to those institutions, it is necessary to ‘see all 
the aids and all the obstacles’, one must ‘know the power and disposition to accept’, 
one must ‘see the things’, one must ‘see the men’.81 This understanding of the 
management of political affairs recalls the idea that politics is the art of the possible, 
not the science of perfection. The powerful images of Neurath’s ship at sea and 
Schiller’s running clock recall that, in political affairs, we are already situated: we 
rebuild the ship at sea; we repair the clock during its rotations.82  
 
Underpinning this is the recognition that prevailing institutions are more complex 
than commonly appreciated. Prevailing institutions express knowledge and 
experience accumulated over generations. In line with the conservative theme of 
scepticism, institutions encapsulate wisdom and furnish structure, stability, 
continuity, and (in the best of cases) unity in ways seldom fully understood.83 This is 
vital in enabling people to pursue their own vision of the good life. Part of the 
complexity of the community lies in the fact that no single institution can be 
regarded as a wholly discrete entity that can be changed without knock-on 
consequences for other arrangements.84 Echoing traditionalism, this suggests that 
because of their interconnected nature, institutions often have a value stretching 
beyond perfunctory assessments whether they fulfill their primary function.85 
Institutions that have endured through time with a reasonable—but, inevitably, an 
imperfect—record will create a rebuttable presumption to support them. This 
presumption is justified not on the basis that the relevant institutions are traditional 
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or long-standing, but because there is evidence that they have been tried and tested, 
and found to contribute to the community, even if imperfectly so. 
 
4. Three Criticisms 
 
Having outlined the conservative disposition, we now consider three criticisms. The 
first views this disposition as unattractive insofar as it is said uncritically to preserve 
vested interests, social and political inequality, and other undesirable states of affairs. 
On this view, this disposition has ‘little appeal’ to those discontented with the status 
quo,86 especially the underprivileged, the impecunious, or those who see no value or 
much disvalue in the current ways of doing things. A conservative disposition, on 
this critique, places too little weight on those who see no or negative value in 
existing arrangements, and entails the unreflective acceptance of those arrangements 
without subjecting them to critical scrutiny.87  
 
This criticism overlooks the fact that all arrangements are subject to critical scrutiny 
under this disposition. That scrutiny is constant and immanent: no institution is 
immune from the possibility of change.88 Conservative arguments speak to an 
assessment of the merits and manner of change, but do not deny the many realities 
and necessities of change. They call for an assessment framed by an all-things-
considered appreciation of the value of prevailing arrangements, including an 
appreciation that some see no value in those arrangements.89 Arrangements are 
valued (if they are) not because they are long-standing, but because, if assessed in the 
round, they have helped to foster good states of affairs. Where that good state of 
affairs has been only partial or otherwise imperfect, the case for change is to prefer 
to improve existing arrangements, not to overhaul them. This preference can be 
overcome, for example when current arrangements contribute only negligibly to the 
good of the community, including where the least well off fare least well under those 
arrangements.90 Complicating matters is that the full repercussions of change take 
time to unfold, and frequently do so in contradictory ways. Overhauling existing 
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institutions is likely to lead to unforeseen consequences, some of which may be 
undesirable. Whichever arrangements are ultimately selected, however, be they now 
prevailing or newly imagined, there will inevitably be imperfections.  
 
A second criticism questions whether the disposition provides sufficient guidance 
about change. Critics doubt whether it is ever possible for a conservative disposition 
to discern which parts of the current arrangements to conserve and which to change. 
After all, prevailing arrangements are complex and comprise intertwined threads. 
Complicating matters further is that various threads may already be changing in 
subtle ways that are difficult to discern. Such concerns lead some to question 
whether this disposition can ever operate as a practical guide to manage change in a 
complex community. The disposition, in other words, fails to offer ‘an adequate 
explanation of deliberate change’.91  
 
A conservative response stresses that it is precisely concerns such as these that 
should form part of the evaluation whether to preserve prevailing arrangements that 
over the years have contributed to the community. It is the difficulty of knowing 
exactly what to change that encourages a discerning approach. That it is difficult to 
craft an account of deliberate change is not to refute a conservative disposition, but 
to affirm its central arguments. Those criticising this disposition for furnishing 
insufficient guidance tend to harbour unrealistic expectations about the sort of 
guidance that can ever exist about whether, when, how, why, and how much to 
change. The complexity of prevailing practices, along with the fact that the 
consequences of change cannot be confidently predicted, suggests that only limited 
guidance can ever be offered about when change is justified. Sound assessments of 
the case for change must instead be concrete and corrective. 
 
A third critique suggests that a conservative disposition lacks coherence. Here, the 
disposition is criticised for responding to change differently depending on when it 
occurs. If change has already occurred it now forms part of the status quo that 
enjoys a presumption that it ought to be conserved, whereas proposals for future 
change are viewed with suspicion. For critics, this implies incoherence at the heart of 
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conservative thought. It also suggests an asymmetry in the assessment of change 
insofar as the disposition seems to neglect the risks of not changing. A related 
criticism suggests that a person confronting the prospect of future change stands on 
shifting sands, insofar as attempts to improve prevailing arrangements via a 
corrective approach to change almost inevitably end up implementing solutions that 
reform more fully than anticipated, involving the sort of innovative approach that 
the disposition purports to eschew.92 
 
This misreads how a conservative disposition assesses the relationship between past 
and future change. For a start, claims of incoherence hold only if a conservative 
disposition is insensitive to context; as an assessment of what now prevails and of 
potential changes, there is no incoherence in looking differently to past and future 
changes.93 What now exists has value and the case for change is subject to critical 
scrutiny. In turn, any risk of inaction must be similarly assessed and it will 
sometimes be concluded that maintaining present arrangements in fact requires 
positive action, a complication to which we return in section 6. As for the risk that 
efforts to improve existing arrangements often involve much more extensive reform 
than anticipated, here too the conservative reply is to acknowledge that this is a 
standing possibility, but to recall that this is amongst the reasons why it is necessary 
to adopt a prudent and clear-headed approach to change of the sort associated with 
this disposition. 
 
5. An Eclipse in Constitutional Thought 
 
We now consider the standing of this disposition within constitutional thought. The 
connections between the UK’s customary constitution and a conservative disposition 
were at one time strong. For much of the twentieth century, the three core 
conservative themes resonated within a constitution widely regarded as ‘a 
summation of political experience’ and ‘substantiated by longevity, continuity, 
assimilation and adaptation’.94 Parliamentary government embodied traditionalism 
(by recognising the political value expressed within long-standing institutions), 
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scepticism (by embracing the constitution as an inherited ‘political way of being’95 
rather than a rational design grounded on abstract principles), and organicisim (as 
reflected in the tradition of the ‘mixed constitution’, with actors cautious before 
interfering with intricate institutional balances). The leitmotif was evolutionary 
adaptation, with parliamentary sovereignty serving as an expression of 
‘constitutional gradualism’.96 These connections were reinforced by and helped to 
buttress the ways in which politicians, judges, officials, and lawyers conceived 
change. Most operated within the tried and tested ways of doing things, preferred to 
regulate via conventions, and were reluctant to overhaul the constitution, preferring 
to absorb change within prevailing institutions. This is to say nothing of law’s 
emphasis on the authority of historic sources and, more particularly, the disposition’s 
connections with the common law, viewed as a corpus of case law that incrementally 
develops by extrapolating the accumulated practical knowledge of the community.97 
 
The contemporary constitution presents a very different context.98 No longer are 
there such strong connections with conservative themes and fewer actors seem to 
embrace a conservative disposition towards change. This is reflected not only in the 
‘unprecedented’ volume of reform in a short space of time,99 but also in the substance 
of many of those reforms. It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that the 
reforming spirit has touched almost all corners of the constitution, including by: 
creating a new tier of devolved government; reforming the House of Lords; 
introducing fixed dates for parliamentary general elections; enacting a statutory bill 
of rights; reforming the appointment, funding, and leadership of the courts; using 
referendums to answer constitutional questions; and abolishing some long-standing 
institutions (the judicial House of Lords) and reshaping others (the Lord 
Chancellor). This is to say nothing of the reconfiguration of executive functions 
inside Whitehall and beyond. Over and above this, parliamentary sovereignty is 
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increasingly questioned and the UK’s relationship with the EU continues to cause 
constitutional tremors.  
 
Interpretations of the significance of these reforms differ. For some, the reforms 
stress continuity as much as change, not least insofar as they have been framed as 
consistent with parliamentary sovereignty and the Westminster model.100 For 
others, their cumulative consequence is to remake arrangements to such an extent 
that it is apt to talk of a ‘new’ constitution.101 There are still others who regard the 
reforms as blending change with continuity, but with assessments differing whether 
the resultant blend is a success or a ‘mess’.102 For our part, the reforms—their 
volume, their frequent justification in terms that privilege abstract principles over 
the constitution’s concrete workings, and the seeming scant regard for spillover 
effects—suggest the eclipse of a conservative disposition.  
 
By design we speak of the ‘eclipse’ of this disposition: its significance has receded, 
but its influence is not altogether absent. Consider the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005. At one level, the Act resoundingly rejected core conservative themes. The Act 
failed to value the tried and tested overlapping roles of the Lord Chancellor (contra 
traditionalism). Overhauling this office and replacing the House of Lords with a 
Supreme Court were justified not on the basis that the then existing arrangements 
no longer worked, but by reference to generalizations on judicial independence and 
the separation of powers (contra scepticism). These reforms suggested a failure to 
grasp how the then prevailing arrangements reinforced shared understandings 
amongst constitutional actors about how the rule of law and judicial independence 
had been secured within the inherited institutional landscape (contra organicism).103 
At another level, conservative arguments shaped the final content of some of the 
reforms. The Government initially sought to abolish the Lord Chancellor, but 
ultimately settled on a substantially reshaped office largely in response to arguments 
that the desired changes should be accommodated within a retained but revised 
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office.104 This illustrates a larger pattern in which the conservative disposition is 
marginalised within contemporary approaches to reform, but continues to influence 
the reforms ultimately adopted.105 
 
A number of critiques of the conservative disposition’s contributions to 
constitutional change help account for its eclipse in public law. Of note is that, in 
contrast to their predecessors, many public lawyers today seem to regard a 
conservative disposition to constitutional change as symptomatic of constitutional 
failure.106 The crudest critique dismisses this disposition as unreflective and without 
intellectual foundation. Such an approach to change is misrepresented as accidental 
or unthinking, as if involving no explanation for, justification of, or even assessment 
of the way things are.107 This is not a serious critique.108 As we have argued, 
intellectual commitments and arguments about value, knowledge, and institutions 
inform a conservative disposition. They may not strike everyone as sound or 
convincing, but this disposition, properly conceived, entails a reflective assessment of 
the problem of change.  
 
A more interesting and challenging set of critiques acknowledges that a conservative 
disposition might have furnished an intelligible approach to change when the UK 
enjoyed a relatively ‘settled constitution’,109 but argues that this is no longer the 
case. One such critique suggests that attempts to accommodate change within a 
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narrative of continuity distort how the constitution is understood by tending to 
overstate continuity and understate discontinuity. For Christine Bell, the propensity 
to claim change as continuity in what some assume is the manner of the conservative 
disposition is the ‘essence of British constitutionalism’, but ‘also operates to deny 
alternative narratives of rupture’.110 Bell cites the contested territorial constitution, 
where a narrative of continuity (devolution coheres with parliamentary sovereignty; 
conventions regulate institutional relationships; broad constitutional consensus and 
shared political identities prevail) conceals the full extent of the discontinuity 
(devolution institutionalises new political communities with divergent policy 
agendas and distinct political identities, with rival and opposing perspectives on the 
constitution hardening as a result).111  
 
This critique highlights the difficulty of assessing the respective degrees of 
continuity and change in a historic constitution. Change may occur in one area of the 
constitution but not others. Continuity in one area might restrict the scope for 
change in another, whilst change in some area may erode continuity in another. All 
of this is true.112 But the difficulty of mapping the relationship of change to 
continuity, and discerning one from the other, holds for all approaches to change, 
conservative or radical or other. A conservative disposition does not have an in-built 
bias in favour of claiming change as continuity. Properly understood, it involves the 
reflective and ongoing examination of the various elements of political life to work 
out what is (and should be) changing and what is (and should be) staying the same. 
Rather than having an in-built tendency to claim change as continuity, this 
disposition underscores the ways in which change is conditioned and channelled—
and it recognises that, in a customary constitution, continuity will provide the 
essential context in which change occurs and in that way will affect the nature and 
extent of change.  
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A related critique suggests that prevailing political and legal conditions are no 
longer conducive to a conservative disposition, unlike the conditions that prevailed 
for much of the twentieth century.113 The constitution is no longer the subject of 
consensus. Parties contest constitutional policy at multiple tiers of government, 
offering competing and even incompatible constitutional visions, with the language 
of ‘crisis’ now a familiar part of the lexicon.114 Constitutional reform—including over 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU, territorial integrity, rights protection, and 
electoral reform—enjoys an electoral salience unrivalled since debates over Home 
Rule and the House of Lords at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Fundamentals such as parliamentary sovereignty and the unitary state are 
increasingly questioned. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the constitutional 
apparatus can no longer be taken for granted, with this unleashing pressures for 
reform that are increasingly difficult to contain within incremental approaches to 
change. 
 
According to this critique, in a political climate where there are electoral imperatives 
to propose reforms to address perceived deficiencies in the constitutional system, it 
becomes difficult not only to uncover much evidence of a conservative disposition, 
but to locate sufficient political and legal space for such a disposition to take hold. 
For a start, there is simply too much change to too many parts of the constitution 
for a conservative disposition to offer reliable guidance about how to respond to 
persistent pressures for reform. On this account, with so much reform having 
already occurred, with significant changes still ongoing, and with popular pressures 
for further change still unmet, the constitutional landscape is insufficiently stable for 
a conservative disposition. It is too difficult to work out which arrangements to 
conserve and which to change, and too challenging to calibrate changes that might 
improve prevailing arrangements without too many undesirable effects. According 
to this critique, the prevailing conditions will become less and less conducive to a 
conservative disposition over time as ‘the dynamic of constitutional reform feeds 
itself’.115  
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This is a challenging critique. We recognise that political and legal conditions mean 
that, for many, a conservative disposition no longer has the same appeal. We also 
recognise that, other things being equal, the assessments about whether, how, when, 
how much, and when to change are easier in the context of a reasonably settled 
constitution. But we resist the suggestion that a conservative disposition has lost its 
relevance in times of change and uncertainty. To illustrate the persistence of its 
contingent but important guidance for public lawyers striving to make sense of a 
changing constitution, we reflect on two proposals for significant constitutional 
reform favoured by some public lawyers: the withdrawal of the UK from the 
European Convention on Human Rights and a written constitution. We argue that a 
conservative disposition remains relevant for assessing the case for change promoted 
by those who favour one or the other constitutional reform. 
 
6. Conservative Arguments for a Changing Constitution 
 
We have sought to identify conservative arguments relating to change that are 
intimated by traditionalism, scepticism, and organicism. None of these arguments 
oppose change indiscriminately. Taken together, they contribute to assessing 
whether, how, why, to what extent change should be pursued, and when. This last 
consideration is especially relevant to a constitution in flux. A conservative 
disposition encourages proposals for change to be evaluated in the light of both the 
deliberate changes that have been planned and the continuous pattern of immanent 
change that characterises any complex community. In the constitutional context, 
this encourages would-be reformers to determine whether to pursue planned 
changes now or after observing how ministers, Parliament, courts, and others have 
adapted to the changes already underway. This lesson is important at all times, but 
especially when deciding whether to pursue change shortly after far-reaching 
reform.  
 
Consider the proposal to withdraw from the ECHR. For some, leaving the EU is an 
assertion of democratic self-government that heralds the potential to reaffirm 
elements of the customary constitution, in part by reasserting the primacy of 
national political authorities and recalibrating the UK’s relationship with 
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international legal regimes and powerful international courts.116 Read this way, the 
case for withdrawing from the ECHR can be seen as a continuation of this larger 
enterprise and, in this, a reform that ‘goes with the grain’ of (at least soon to be) 
prevailing arrangements. However, conservative arguments caution against 
assessments that underplay fundamental shifts in constitutional affairs. 
Traditionalism argues that, for many, withdrawing from the EU marks the loss of a 
valuable, tried and tested (even if imperfect) relationship with international 
institutions and with the idea of shared European identity. Scepticism argues that 
the risk of mismanaging the change brought about by Brexit is real, with the 
consequences of the UK’s future relationship with Europe impossible to predict with 
any certainty. The EU and the ECHR were both the work of many hands and 
although for some leaving the former is exhilarating, the work ahead will be 
laborious. Organicism points to the role of institutions in securing political and 
social order as a reason to be careful before changing too many institutions at once. 
This has a special relevance here, given that the UK’s departure from the ECHR 
involves redefining many of the same international relationships as leaving the EU, 
and further risks disturbing internal relationships between central and devolved 
institutions. Taken together, and even granting (for the purposes of argument) that 
withdrawing from the ECHR is a desirable reform that ‘goes with the grain’ of 
Brexit, the conservative disposition highlights that the case for pursuing this change 
now must be assessed against the case for postponing such reform to some point in 
the future.  
 
The current political and legal uncertainty signals a different case for a very 
different reform. For some public lawyers, the fragility of the UK’s constitution, and 
especially the place of human rights and the status and privileges of the devolved 
institutions within it, does not herald the reassertion of the customary constitution; 
it underlines instead the need for a written constitution.117 Some entertain reforms 
that would comprehensively remake the historic constitution, viewing withdrawal 
from the EU as the prelude to a ‘constitutional moment’ that could lead to 
transformative change,118 culminating in a written constitution. Such a constitution 
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would be part codification, part clarification, and part reform.119 For its proponents, 
a written constitution would provide an opportunity to secure certainty, clarity, and 
the priority of constitutional principle in political and legal affairs and to award to 
the constitution a democratic mandate.120 All of this could be done, on one reading at 
least, in ways that ‘might subsequently appear to be a natural outgrowth’121 of recent 
reforms. 
 
A conservative disposition contributes, once again, to an assessment of this case for 
change by stressing the importance of evaluating change in light of the complexity 
of the whole constitutional system. The claim that this disposition is associated with 
slow and incremental change encourages some to mischaracterise it as inattentive to 
how discrete changes can have sizable systemic effects. The opposite is nearer the 
truth. An indispensable contribution of this disposition is that any purportedly 
discrete proposal for change should be considered in light of its implications for 
wider arrangements. Taking into account the complexity of political organisation 
tends to encourage an appreciation of the value of tried and tested constitutional 
arrangements that have endured through time with a reasonable if imperfect record. 
Those who advocate for a written constitution may deny that the present 
constitution is working well, but they are unlikely to deny that it has merit. 
Although for many public lawyers the ‘present discontents’122 are real, few would 
argue that they match the conditions under which many of the world’s written 
constitutions were adopted. Those conditions generally aligned with Burke’s 
thought that far-reaching change can be justified on grounds of necessity to be 
measured on the basis of concrete political circumstances.123 Those concrete political 
circumstances should be assessed in the round and, when a proposal for change is 
evaluated in light of the complexity of the whole system, it often leads to a greater 
willingness to accept imperfect institutions, with the decision made to improve 
rather than upend the prevailing arrangements.  
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A willingness to accept (at least for now) imperfect arrangements is supported by 
conservative arguments. Traditionalism recalls that, though a written constitution 
may bring gains, change also brings losses, including the loss of an attachment to a 
constitutional tradition that has long distinguished the UK and given it a sense of 
identity.124 Scepticism recalls that the accumulated experience of the UK’s customary 
constitution captures political wisdom and its evolutionary nature facilitates a close 
appreciation of the truth in experience, an appreciation that is harder to maintain 
when a constitution is adopted at a moment in time and eschews the sort of day-to-
day evolution characteristic of a customary constitution. Organicism recognises that 
some changes have knock-on consequences that cannot be predicted with confidence. 
Again, these conservative arguments do not indiscriminately deny the case for 
change. Their contribution is to the assessment of the case for change, and that 
contribution is especially relevant (if also easy to overlook) when the UK is ‘in the 
unusual position of having an unwritten constitution that works passably well—
sufficiently well, at least, to allow us to consider whether we want a new 
constitution’.125 In short, the case for a written constitution, as with the proposal to 
withdraw from the ECHR, helps to explain why a conservative disposition remains 
relevant during times of constitutional change and uncertainty. The burden of 
crafting a compelling case for change may seem to be easier to meet in such times, 
but conservative arguments instead highlight how the case for change may in fact be 
weakened by too much change.  
 
Our suggestion, then, is that conservative arguments are especially relevant at a 
time of change and uncertainty and hold for public lawyers with opposing 
assessments of our current constitutional condition. In the present constitutional 
context, there are two connected conundrums confronting any public lawyer who 
seeks to employ these arguments to the problem of change: first, how to determine 
when a ‘past’ constitutional reform is so bad that it should be undone; and second, 
how to determine when proactive change is required to prevent the atrophy of the 
constitutional status quo. What guidance—if any—does the conservative disposition 
provide in the face of these conundrums? Here, our starting point is to recall that the 
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conservative disposition only ever offers open-ended and contingent guidance about 
how to respond to the problem of change; it furnishes arguments that complicate the 
case for change, but does not prescribe in detail the changes that should be made or 
not. A conservative disposition, as we understand it, advocates for conservative 
reasoning, but not for conservative answers or outcomes or policies.  
 
On the first conundrum: on its face, undoing wrong-headed reforms seems to go 
against the grain of the conservative disposition. However, determining whether to 
undo some bad past reform is part of the problem of change, and it can be subjected 
to conservative reasoning. Under this reasoning, it is always possible to seek to undo 
past change where this is recommended by experience. This decision should only be 
taken after weighing up the risks associated with further change, with that 
assessment made on the basis of material considerations. It may ultimately be 
decided that the past change should not be undone because the high costs of that 
earlier change have already been incurred (and, indeed, might have been even higher 
if earlier conservative calls for gradual change had been neglected).126 In addition, a 
conservative calculus may suggest that, over time, the prevailing arrangements that 
are a partial product of past change may now have value worth conserving, either as 
particular bearers of value that cannot be treated merely as dispensable or as being 
known and experienced by persons. This recognises that further change would incur 
loss, which complicates the case for reform. Critically, these determinations must all 
be made by reference to actual workings of the constitution, not abstract principles.  
 
The inclination is to be corrective rather than innovative. For example, rather than 
withdraw from the ECHR, a conservative assessment might suggest amending those 
provisions of the Human Rights Act that shape how the Strasbourg Court’s case law 
is received into domestic law or how domestic courts should interpret Convention 
rights. But this inclination falls away if the conservative calculus suggests that the 
past reform is so ‘bad’ that it risks further undercutting other aspects of the 
constitution. In such a situation, the conservative disposition will countenance the 
more far-reaching change of undoing a recent reform in order to secure other 
aspects of the constitution. It may be, for example, that some public lawyers will 
conclude that repealing the Fixed Term Parliament Act 2011 is necessary in order 
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to reaffirm ‘the confidence relationship’ as a constitutive feature of parliamentary 
democracy in the UK.127 A key consideration during a period of flux will be to do 
this sensitive to what is realistic and prudent in the political and legal circumstances, 
including thinking about timing (ie whether to undo this past change now because 
the risk to the working of the constitution is so great, or to wait because the risks of 
destabilising other parts of the constitution are too great at this point in 
time). Complicating all of this is the need to assess the risks of both action and 
inaction, all the while recognising that the case for further deliberate change 
(including to undo previous reforms) must also be evaluated against the immanent 
change that accompanies all arrangements, as they are subjected to the cauldron of 
experience and shaped by environmental developments around them.128  
 
This brings us to the second conundrum. Conservative thought has tended to offer 
little guidance on when proactive change is required to ensure things essentially 
remain the same. Much conservative thought draws overly stark contrasts between a 
supposedly stable quo and far-reaching change, where the former is maintained by 
resisting the latter. But sometimes the proactive pursuit of change is necessary to 
maintain the status quo. This is especially important where, for example, a changing 
external environment leads to the inadvertent transformation of prevailing 
institutions and practices. In such circumstances, ‘renovative’ change may be 
necessary: proactive change that is aimed at conserving current arrangements.129 
The need to consider renovative change is especially important during a period of 
constitutional flux. After all, when the political and legal landscape is very fluid, 
there is a real risk that institutions will be transformed inadvertently unless action is 
taken to prevent such transformation.  
 
There is much more work to be done to elucidate the guidance that a conservative 
disposition offers those deciding whether, how, and when to pursue renovative 
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change. For now, we follow Martin Beckstein in suggesting that, all other things 
being equal, the case for renovative change is compelling where necessary to 
conserve the basic nature or function of the institution or an important part of it.130 
Such a case will be especially powerful where the aggregate results of a series of 
discrete changes over time risk inadvertently transforming the constitution or part 
of it. For example, some now argue that renovative change is necessary to maintain 
(what they take to be) the good sense informing the traditional separation of powers 
between political and judicial institutions. On this view, the judicial function is at 
risk of being transformed as the cumulative consequence of a mix of deliberate 
change (such as the conferral of new powers on the courts under the Human Rights 
Act) and immanent change (such as changes in traditional legal reasoning as a result 
of the increasingly dominant place of proportionality and balancing in judicial 
reasoning).131 This has led some to argue for renovative change that would (on their 
view) stabilize the separation of powers. Others today debate whether electoral 
reform is necessary to preserve the executive-legislative relationship at Westminster 
in the face of the fragmentation of the party system together with the emergence of 
profound divisions on the UK’s relationship with the EU that cross the traditional 
ideological divide. In such situations, the conservative disposition would 
countenance proactive change to institutional structures or cultures in order to 
conserve the basic nature or identity of that institution. In keeping with conservative 
responses to the problem of change, the decision to pursue renovative change must 
be based on material not abstract considerations, and must acknowledge that this 
carries all of the costs and risks attendant upon any change. The guidance provided 
by conservative reasoning is open-ended and eludes easy answers, but this is part of 
its contribution to the problem of change. By complicating the inference from ‘A is 
better than B’ to ‘A ought to replace B’, a conservative disposition helps public 
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For much of the last century, constitutional thought exhibited a conservative 
disposition. Today, not only is its hold on constitutional thought waning, but many 
public lawyers no longer have a good understanding of it. We have sought to 
identify the main intellectual commitments of the conservative disposition, 
explaining how it offers open-ended guidance on the problem of whether, how, why, 
when, and how much to change. By reviewing the core themes of traditionalism, 
scepticism, and organicism, we have sought to tackle some commonplace 
misunderstandings of this disposition and, in so doing, bring into view arguments 
about change often overlooked in constitutional debates. We have also sought to 
reflect some of this disposition’s subtleties that are absent from discussions that 
reduce conservatism to little more than ‘a defence of lost causes’.132 A conservative 
disposition will not provide every insight needed to make sense of a changing 
constitution, but there is a very real risk of losing sight of important aspects of the 
constitution and its reform if distinctively conservative arguments are neglected. 
This risk is greatest at a time of high levels of change and uncertainty.  
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